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Abstract
Network pruning has been known to produce compact models
without much accuracy degradation. However, how the prun-
ing process affects a network’s robustness and the working
mechanism behind remain unresolved. In this work, we theo-
retically prove that the sparsity of network weights is closely
associated with model robustness. Through experiments on a
variety of adversarial pruning methods, we find that weights
sparsity will not hurt but improve robustness, where both
weights inheritance from the lottery ticket and adversarial
training improve model robustness in network pruning. Based
on these findings, we propose a novel adversarial training
method called inverse weights inheritance, which imposes
sparse weights distribution on a large network by inheriting
weights from a small network, thereby improving the robust-
ness of the large network.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that deep neural networks (DNNs) are
usually over-parameterized, and network pruning has been
adopted to remove insignificant weights from a large neural
network without hurting the accuracy. Despite its success,
pruning strategies have been rarely discussed in the adver-
sarial learning setting where the network is trained against
adversarial examples, and the robustness of the network is as
important as accuracy.
It is unclear what pruning methods are effective and which
factors are critical for retaining model robustness. Believing
that the inherited model weights may not be effective in pre-
serving network accuracy (Ye et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019),
Ye et al. (2019) propose a concurrent adversarial training
and weight pruning framework to seek a compressed robust
model. Gui et al. (2019) further incorporates pruning and
several other techniques into a unified optimization frame-
work to preserve high robustness while achieving a high
compression ratio. However, the conventional three-stage
‘training–pruning–fine-tuning’ pipeline has not been closely
examined in the adversarial context. More crucially, it is un-
clear which components in the network pruning methods are
critical to preserving model performance. To this end, we
design a comprehensive set of experiments to answer these
questions.
∗Equal contribution.
†Joint first corresponding author.
Despite some adversarial pruning methods that have been
proposed, there is still a lack of theoretical foundation to ex-
plain the working mechanism behind those methods. In fact,
there are seemingly contradictory opinions on the robustness
of pruned networks: Madry et al. (2018) suggests network
capacity is crucial to robustness, and a wider network is more
likely to obtain higher accuracy and robustness than a simple
network. In contrast, Guo et al. (2018) theoretically proves
that an appropriately higher weight sparsity implies stronger
robustness on naturally trained models. Other theories such
as the ‘Lottery Ticket Hypothesis’ (Frankle and Carbin 2019)
point out that, a subnetwork extracted from a large network
can always achieve comparable performance with the origi-
nal one in the natural setting. However, it remains unknown
if the hypothesis holds true for adversarially robust networks.
We are motivated to explore how adversarial pruning affects
the intrinsic characteristics of the network and its impact on
model robustness.
In this study, we find that the robustness of the model im-
proves as its weights become sparser. We show that weights
sparsity not only includes the traditional L0-sparsity, i.e., the
number of parameters retained, but also a weight distribu-
tion closer to zero, represented generally by the Lp norm of
weights. These forms of sparsity can lead to robustness im-
provement, which is verified theoretically and experimentally.
By extensive experiments on a variety of state-of-the-art prun-
ing methods, models, and datasets, we also demonstrate that
a pruned network inheriting weights from a large robust net-
work has improved robustness than a network with the same
structure but randomly initialized weights. Moreover, weight
inheritance implicitly produces sparser weights distributions
on adversarially pruned models.
Inspired by the connection between model sparsity and
robustness, we propose a new adversarial training strategy
called Inverse Weights Inheritance: by inheriting weights
from a pruned model, a large network can achieve higher
robustness than being adversarially trained from scratch. The
pruned model can be the ‘winning ticket’ of the large network,
as we verify that ‘Lottery Ticket Hypothesis’ (Frankle and
Carbin 2019) holds true in the adversarial learning context.
The performance results of our proposed training strategy
corroborate that sparse weights and high capacity are not
contradictory, but contribute joint efforts to model robustness.
The contributions of the paper can be summarized as fol-
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Figure 1: The relation between parameter numbers and ad-
versarial robustness in our approach and the state-of-the-art
methods on different architectures. The dotted lines represent
the baselines of three base (large) models. Models residing at
the upper left corner have higher adversarial accuracies and
smaller sizes. All models are adversarially trained by PGD
with  = 8/255 and 10 steps, and evaluated by PGD attack
of  = 8/255 and 100 steps on CIFAR10. We also mark the
results Guo et al. (2020) and Gui et al. (2019) by stars in the
same settings. Our experiments show that adversarial prun-
ing methods are effective in obtaining networks of smaller
parameters with comparable or even better robustness than
the baselines.
lows. First, we establish the theoretical connection between
network robustness and sparsity. Second, through compre-
hensive experiments, we find that weights inheritance and
adversarial training are important in adversarial pruning, and
implicitly provide weights sparsity. Finally, we propose a
new adversarial training strategy that achieves improved ro-
bustness.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training and its vari-
ants are proposed to improve network robustness against ad-
versarial examples (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017).
Madry et al. (2018) motivates projected gradient descent
(PGD) as a universal ‘first-order adversary,’ and optimizes
the saddle point formulation to train a robust network. Gold-
blum et al. (2020) observes robustness can transfer between
networks by knowledge distillation, and such transfer can
even improve the robustness of the student network. Follow-
ing the convention, we adopt L∞-PGD attack (Madry et al.
2018), i.e., the strongest attack utilizing the local first-order
information of the network, both in adversarial training strat-
egy and the robustness evaluations.
Network Pruning Methods. Network pruning methods
related to this paper can be divided into two categories: struc-
tured pruning and unstructured pruning. Structured pruning
prunes a network at the level of filters (Lang 2018; Li et al.
2017; Luo, Wu, and Lin 2017), channels (Liu et al. 2017)
or columns (Wen et al. 2016), depending on their respective
importance. The importance of a filter or a channel can be
determined by the norm of the weights (Li et al. 2017) or
the channel scaling factor (Ye et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2017)
(sometimes the scaling factor in batch normalization layers).
The unstructured pruning (LeCun, Denker, and Solla 1990;
Hassibi and Stork 1993) prunes at the level of individual
weight according to the Hessian matrix of the loss function.
Han et al. (2015) proposes to prune weights with small mag-
nitude, and the compression ratio is further enhanced in Han,
Mao, and Dally (2016) by quantization and Huffman cod-
ing. By incorporating non-negative stochastic gates, Louizos,
Welling, and Kingma (2018) turns network pruning into an
optimization problem with L0-norm regularization. We pick
representative structured and unstructured pruning methods
to implement in our experiments.
Network Pruning in Adversarial Context. Network
pruning in adversarial context has been recently discussed in
search of small and robust models (Wang et al. 2018; Zhao
et al. 2018; Ye et al. 2019; Sehwag et al. 2019). Several
frameworks (Rakin et al. 2019; Madaan, Shin, and Hwang
2019; Gui et al. 2019) have been proposed to adversarially
train a neural network while constraining its size by pruning
and/or quantization. However, these works do not answer
which pruning factors are important for robust networks, nor
which pruning methods are effective.
The ‘lottery ticket hypothesis’ (Frankle and Carbin 2019)
shows the existence of a sparse subnetwork (or ‘winning
ticket’) in a randomly initialized network that can reach com-
parable performance with the large network. Nevertheless,
Ye et al. (2019) argues against the existence of ‘winning
ticket’ in adversarial settings. On the other hand, Cosentino
et al. (2019) manages to acquire adversarial winning tickets
of simple models without harming model robustness. Li et al.
(2020) further proposed an optimized learning rate schedule
to boost the searching performance of lottery tickets, while
demonstrating why Ye et al. (2019) fails to find them.
Liu et al. (2019) claims that for network pruning in the
natural setting, weights inherited by unstructured and prede-
fined structured pruning may not be useful, as it may trap
the pruned network to bad local minima. We show with ex-
periments that weight inheritance improves the robustness
in the adversarial setting, which we conjecture that this is
because the inverse weights inheritance embrace larger net-
works during training, which can help jump out of local
minima and achieve better generalization performance. Hein
and Andriushchenko (2017) proposes a formal guarantee of
adversarial robustness in terms of the local Lipschitz constant.
By building a bridge between the local Lipschitz constant
and weight sparsity, Guo et al. (2018) considers that an appro-
priately higher weight sparsity on naturally trained networks
implies higher robustness. Dinh et al. (2020) also finds an ad-
versarially trained network with sparser weights distribution
tends to be more robust, such as EnResNet20 (Wang, Shi,
and Osher 2019). Different from compression, Dhillon et al.
(2018) proposes dynamic sparsity as an approach to improve
robustness. By supplementing the concept of ‘sparsity,’ we
found empirical evidence of the link between robustness and
sparsity, as well as training strategies to boost robustness.
3 Study of Robustness and Network Pruning
In this section, we theoretically prove that sparser weights
distribution indicates an improved level of robustness. In the
theoretical deduction, we assume DNNs with ReLU activa-
tion functions, but the conclusion can be generalized to a
variety of models, as we verify by experiments.
We focus on nonlinear DNNs with ReLU activation func-
tions for classification tasks as an example to study the con-
nection between sparsity and robustness. Let us consider
a multi-layer perceptron g (·) trained with labeled training
datasets {(xi, yi)}. Each layer of the network is parameter-
ized by a weight matrix Wd ∈ Rnd−1×nd and wk =Wd[:, k]
represents the weights associated with the k-th class in the
final layer. σ denotes the ReLU function. Then the prediction
scores of xi for class k can be denoted as
gk (xi) = w
T
k σ
(
WTd−1σ
(
...σ
(
WT1 xi
)))
. (1)
Let yˆ = argmaxk∈{1,...,c} gk (x) denote the class with
the highest prediction score. Assuming the classifier is
Lipschitz continuous, the local Lipschitz constant of func-
tion gyˆ (x) − gk (x) over the neighborhood of x is de-
fined as Lkq,x = maxx∈Bp(0,R) ‖∇gyˆ(x)−∇gk(x)‖, where
Bp (x,R) denotes a ball centered at x with radius R under
Lp norm. Previous works (Hein and Andriushchenko 2017;
Guo et al. 2018) have associated robustness with the local
Lipschitz constant by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Hein and Andriushchenko 2017; Guo et al.
2018) Let yˆ = argmaxk∈{1,...,c} gk (x) and 1p +
1
q = 1.
For any perturbation δx ∈ Bp (0, R), p ∈ R+ and a set of
Lipschitz continuous functions {gk : Rn 7→ R}, the classifi-
cation decision on x′ will not change with
‖δx‖p ≤ min
{
min
k 6=yˆ
gyˆ (x)− gk (x)
Lkq,x
}
, (2)
where Lkq,x = maxx′∈Bp(0,R) ‖∇gyˆ(x′)−∇gk(x′)‖.
Eqn. (2) has clearly depicted the relation between robust-
ness and the local Lipschitz constant — a smaller Lkq,x repre-
sents a higher level of robustness as a larger distortion can be
tolerated without changing the prediction. Guo et al. (2018)
further gives the relation between the local Lipschitz constant
and the weights. We further deduct that the relation satisfies
the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (The robustness and weights distribution of
ReLU networks.) Letting 1p +
1
q = 1, for any x ∈ Rn,
k ∈ {1, ..., c} and q ∈ {1, 2}, the local Lipschitz constant of
function gyˆ (x)− gk (x) satisfies
Lkq,x ≤ ‖wyˆ − wk‖q
d−1∏
j=1
(
‖Wj‖p
)
. (3)
Note that the local Lipschitz constant is upper bounded by
the product of the Lp-norm of the weights matrices. That
is to say, if ‖Wj‖p is small, Lkq,x is constrained to be small,
leading to a higher level of robustness. The proof of Thm. 2
is omitted here due to space constraint and we refer readers
to the supplementary document for the detailed proof.
We have at least two interpretations of Thm. 2: if we
let p = 0, Eqn. (3) is bounded by the number of non-zero
weights of the model, and hence the higher the proportion of
non-zero weights, the more robust the model is. On the other
hand, a smaller value of ‖Wj‖p suggests the distribution of
weights is closer to zero. This indicates that if a model has a
weights distribution closer to zero, it may be more robust than
other models with the same structure. We will respectively
show how the two points are supported by the experimental
results.
4 Performance Evaluation
4.1 Implementation Details
In this part, we describe the implementation details in examin-
ing adversarially robust network pruning. To obtain objective
results, we mostly follow the experimental settings in previ-
ous works (Liu et al. 2019; Yang et al. 2019; Ye et al. 2019;
Zhang and Zhu 2019). Our experiments are carried out with
PyTorch 1.0 on NVIDIA GeForce 2080 Ti GPUs.
Datasets and Networks. For the fairness of the results,
we conduct experiments on CIFAR-10, Tiny-ImageNet,
and CIFAR-100, which are representatives for small-scale
datasets, large-scale datasets and datasets somewhere in be-
tween. Three state-of-the-art network architectures are cho-
sen: VGG (Simonyan and Zisserman 2015), ResNet (He et al.
2016), and DenseNet (Huang et al. 2017) as the base large
networks. A DenseNet-BC with depth 40 and growth rate
k = 12 is also used.
One-Shot Pruning Methods. We pick four representative
and intrinsically different pruning methods: Global Unstruc-
tured Pruning (GUP) (Frankle and Carbin 2019), Local Un-
structured Pruning (LUP) (Han, Mao, and Dally 2016), Filter
Pruning (FP) (Li et al. 2017) and Network Slimming (NS)
(Liu et al. 2017). LUP and GUP are unstructured pruning,
whereas FP and NS are structured pruning. Both GUP and
NS prune globally according to the importance of weights or
channels across all convolutional layers, while LUP and FP
prune an identical percentage of weights or filters per layer
locally. FP is a predefined pruning method while GUP, LUP
and NS are automatic pruning methods where the structure is
determined by the pruning algorithm at runtime.
We conduct these pruning methods in a one-shot manner
that removes the parameters at one step, followed by post
retraining to convergence. For all pruning methods, we re-
implement each to achieve comparable performance with
that reported in the current literature. For FP in ResNet, we
conduct it on every two consecutive convolutional layers and
skip the shortcuts according to (Luo, Wu, and Lin 2017), also
it is not available on DenseNet as pruning one filter would
lead to input channel changes in all subsequent layers (Li
et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2019). For NS, the highest pruning ratio
is selected according to the maximum channel pruning ratio
to avoid the removal of layers (Liu et al. 2017).
Adversarial Training and Evaluation. We employ the
widely usedL∞-PGD adversary with  = 8/255, step size =
2/255 in our experiments. Following recent works (Guo et al.
Table 1: Clean testing accuracy/adversarial testing accuracy (in %)/distortion lower bound of pruned networks with
adversarial retraining. Accuracy and distortion bounds higher than the base model are in bold.
(a) One-Shot Pruning on CIFAR-10 w/ Stop-E
Network p% LUP GUP FP NS
ResNet18
(82.84/49.40/2.519)
30 82.13/49.9/3.221 81.92/46.56/2.402 83.62/46.61/2.505 84.18/49.92/2.023
60 82.21/48.44/2.777 84.73/49.64/2.612 82.61/48.08/2.501 83.57/49.46/2.666
90 80.09/46.76/1.533 83.89/47.09/2.940 78.87/46.24/1.764 -
VGG16
(78.57/44.68/3.471)
30 79.81/43.17/1.982 80.43/44.24/1.630 77.05/43.91/3.002 80.10/43.81/2.991
60 78.78/43.30/2.136 80.26/43.51/2.275 77.13/44.21/2.032 79.56/44.29/2.607
90 72.1/41.98/2.510 79.83/44.36/2.501 69.38/41.20/2.270 79.54/43.76/2.443
DenseNet-BC
(76.01/44.26/1.109)
30 74.42/43.76/1.525 74.68/43.40/2.928 - 73.86/43.08/2.572
60 73.16/42.70/1.734 73.24/42.88/1.781 - 66.33/37.54/1.059
90 63.15/36.68/2.000 65.19/36.85/1.784 - -
(b) One-Shot Pruning on Tiny-ImageNet w/ Stop-C
Network p% LUP GUP FP NS
ResNet18
(41.94/14.43/2.594)
30 42.72/14.87/2.356 43.18/15.82/2.713 42.68/14.91/3.300 41.89/15.23/2.397
60 42.28/15.51/3.022 42.80/16.12/3.272 40.88/15.87/1.172 37.92/14.11/3.250
90 40.32/16.11/2.581 42.21/17.26/2.797 36.79/14.43/1.819 -
DenseNet121
(49.48/19.65/1.922)
30 48.86/20.03/3.616 48.19/20.52/2.519 - 46.43/19.71/1.597
60 48.63/19.98/2.300 48.96/19.92/1.984 - 40.82/16.51/3.334
90 45.72/18.75/1.722 46.99/18.65/1.478 - -
2020), we utilize iteration = 10 for adversarial training, and
evaluate robustness on iteration = 100. For all trainings, we
adopt a SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and weight
decay of 5×10−4. The batch sizes for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 are both 128. On Tiny-ImageNet, the batch size is 128
for ResNet18 and 32 for DenseNet121 following Zhang and
Zhu (2019) and Yang et al. (2019). The distortion bound of
adversarial examples (Bastani et al. 2016; Salman et al. 2019)
also serves as a robustness metric, which is estimated by
searching the minimum PGD  that crafts a valid adversarial
image on a given batch. We report the average of distortion
bounds across all samples.
Stopping Criteria. Typically, it is not well-defined how
to train models to ‘full convergence’ when stepwise decay-
ing learning rate schedule is applied. Hence we adopt two
stopping criteria indicating models have been sufficiently
trained for ease of comparison. Stop-E denotes the network is
trained for a fixed number of epochs. For CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100, and Tiny-ImageNet, we set the start learning rate to be
0.1, 0.1,, and 0.01, respectively. The learning rate is divided
by 10 for every 1/3 of the total epochs. Stop-C monitors the
validation loss changes to automatically adjust the learning
rate. For example, if we define patience to be 10 epochs and
relative threshold to be 10−5, the learning rate only decays
when the average validation loss does not decrease by more
than 0.001% for consecutive 10 epochs. Models stop training
after 2 learning rate decays.
4.2 Adversarial Network Pruning Improves
Robustness by Imposing Higher Sparsity
Although Thm. 2 establishes a preliminary link between spar-
sity and robustness, it does not tell us how to achieve sparsity
and therefore robustness by the equation. An intuitive way is
to prune a network to reduce the number of non-zero weights
of the model, which is also done in (Guo et al. 2018) but only
in the natural setting. We show in the following that pruning
also works in the adversarial setting. Beyond that, we found
that adversarial retraining after pruning mostly improves ro-
bustness, at a sparser weights distribution than models with
the same structure.
We first adversarially train each base network until reach-
ing the state-of-the-art clean and adversarial accuracy, and
then prune each network by different means.
Although pruning shows a promising method to introduce
sparsity, it does not end up in robust models each time. We
hence impose adversarial retraining on pruned networks to
enhance robustness. The results are provided in Table 1. Since
there is a tradeoff between accuracy and robustness (Zhang
et al. 2019), and some models tend to sacrifice one for the
other, we choose to report the performance where the sum of
adversarial accuracy and clean accuracy is the highest. Dis-
tortion bound is also reported for a complete view. We refer
readers to the supplementary material for further discussions
on the results.
Most networks in Table 1 obtain higher accuracy and ro-
bustness than pruning without retraining, and a large propor-
tion of them can achieve better performance than the base
networks. Specifically, LUP and NS only suffer notable per-
formance degradation at high pruning ratios, whereas GUP
remains a remarkable high performance across all pruning
ratios. FP cannot preserve network performance well.
To see whether the weights inherited from a large network
help the pruned network converge, we conduct a series of
comparison experiments, as shown in Table 2. Compared to
FP, FP-rand initializes a small network with the same struc-
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Figure 2: Weights distribution of the pruned network adversarially trained with inherited weights or randomly initialized
weights. In general, networks with inherited weights from automatic pruning methods including LUP, GUP, NS have an equivalent
or higher sparsity than their counterparts with randomly initialized weights. FP has lower sparsity than FP-rand.
Table 2: Clean testing accuracy/adversarial testing accu-
racy (in %) of scratch networks that shares the same structure
with the corresponding pruned network, only with the weights
randomly initialized. Accuracy and distortion bounds higher
than the base model are in bold.
One-Shot Pruning w/ Randomly Initialized Weights
on CIFAR-10 w/ Stop-E
Network p% LUP-rand GUP-rand FP-rand NS-rand
ResNet18
30 81.91/46.54 81.41/48.78 82.24/46.58 83.21/46.28
60 82.58/46.40 81.91/47.46 80.64/46.22 82.61/46.04
90 78.36/44.97 81.99/46.90 80.34/45.50 -
VGG16
30 79.67/42.37 79.56/45.26 80.27/44.38 78.68/43.52
60 78.26/43.79 80.23/45.22 78.52/44.21 78.77/43.74
90 72.32/41.38 77.78/43.97 74.24/42.39 77.37/43.52
ture as the corresponding pruned network. For automatic
pruning methods including LUP, GUP, and NS, we re-use
the pruned network structure with re-initialized weights. As
we found, compared with FP-rand, FP provides little or no
improvement with the inherited weights. On the contrary,
automatic pruning with inherited weights almost always per-
forms better than that with randomly initialized weights.
Although Table 1, and Table 2 experimentally found ef-
fective methods or factors to gain robustness for pruned net-
works, it still remains unclear how it relates to sparsity. Inter-
estingly, by examining the weights distribution after adver-
sarial retraining, we found that most automatically pruned
networks with inherited weights have similar or higher spar-
sity than those with randomly initialized weights, as some
examples shown in Fig. 2, while the networks pruned by
predefined pruning (FP) show the opposite trend. This could
be explained by Thm. 2, since a weight distribution closer to
zero implies higher robustness. Therefore, weight inheritance
and adversarial retraining implicitly provide a way to obtain
sparse networks.
Comparison with previous results. We also compare our
conclusion with previous works and summarize the difference
as follows. We find inherited weights by automatic pruning
(LUP, GUP, NS) provide better initialization for small net-
works, while predefined pruning does not. Liu et al. (2019)
argues that weights inherited from structured pruning have lit-
tle impact on the performance of the pruned network. While
the experiments on FP agree with the conclusion, that on NS
does not. Wang et al. (2018) also suggests inherited weights
are important to preserving network accuracy and robustness
in adversarial settings, but they do not discuss the working
mechanism behind.
4.3 Lottery Tickets in Adversarial Settings
We seek that in a randomly-initialized large network, if a
subnetwork exists achieving comparable robustness as the
large one, which is also known as the ‘winning ticket’ in
Frankle and Carbin (2019) in a natural setting. More specifi-
cally, we perform Alg. 1 to find out the ‘winning ticket’ in
the adversarial setting. A discussion of hyperparameters can
be found in the supplementary material.
The results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are displayed in
Table 3. We mark the results with comparable performance
to the base large networks in bold. On ResNet18 and VGG16
trained on CIFAR-10, no noticeable performance degrada-
tion occurs when the pruning ratio is as high as 80%. This
is slightly different from pruning on natural models (Fran-
kle and Carbin 2019), where accuracies do not drop until
pruning ratio reaches around 88.2% and 92% respectively
on Resnet18 and VGG16. We think the difference may be
Algorithm 1 Lottery Ticket in Adversarial Settings
Input: A large network f (x; θ0 M0) where x is the input, θ0
is the randomly initialized weights, and M0 = 1|θ0| denot-
ing weight masks.
Iterative pruning ratio p%.
Pruning iteration K.
Training epochs N per pruning iteration.
Output: A winning ticket f (x; θ0 MK).
1: for k in {1, . . . ,K} do
2: Conduct adversarial training on f (x; θ0 Mk−1) for N
epochs and obtain the network f (x; θk Mk−1).
3: Prune p% weights from the current network and obtain a
new weights mask Mk.
4: Re-initialize weights of f as f (x; θ0 Mk).
5: end for
6: return f (x; θ0 MK).
Table 3: Clean testing accuracy/adversarial testing accu-
racy (in %) of adversarially trained ‘winning ticket.’ p% is
the pruning ratio. ‘60 (20× 3 iter)’ means iteratively remove
20% of the weights in each for 3 iterations to achieve a final
pruning ratio of 60%. Each iteration of pruning is preceded
by 1 epoch of training, and the total training epoch is 240.
Accuracy and distortion bounds higher than the base model
are in bold.
Winning Tickets on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 w/ Stop-E
Network p% CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
ResNet18
0 (baseline) 82.84/49.40 50.50/21.13
30 (30× 1 iter) 84.29/45.54 50.62/21.72
60 (20× 3 iter) 84.03/47.99 52.68/21.54
80 (20× 4 iter) 81.41/48.19 52.23/20.80
90 (30× 3 iter) 70.29/47.36 49.43/21.27
95 (31.7× 3 iter) 70.29/39.35 -
VGG16
0 (baseline) 78.57/44.68 44.44/18.86
30 (30× 1 iter) 80.90/45.58 42.21/19.16
60 (20× 3 iter) 80.05/45.56 42.65/19.12
80 (20× 4 iter) 79.30/45.16 45.90/18.93
90 (30× 3 iter) 78.87/45.15 45.76/18.89
95 (31.7× 3 iter) 68.48/40.10 -
explained by the more complicated decision boundary of a
robust model (in theory, a model with a higher Rademacher
complexity is needed to achieve adversarial robustness), and
hence its ‘winning ticket’ requires a higher capacity.
To better understand lottery tickets in adversarial settings,
we compare the weights distribution between one-shot pruned
model and the winning ticket at the same pruning ratio. Fig. 3
illustrates the example of two models pruned at the same prun-
ing ratio by GUP and Alg. 1 respectively on CIFAR10, with
adversarial accuracy 47.09% versus 47.36% on ResNet18,
and 44.36% versus 45.15% on VGG16, correspondingly. As
we observe, whereas GUP models tend to have a flatter dis-
tribution which is consistent with Ye et al. (2019), the win-
ning tickets have more near-zero valued weights, indicating
a higher level of sparsity. Thus we conclude that it is able to
achieve preferable adversarial robustness through the lottery
tickets settings.
Comparison with previous results. Ye et al. (2019) ar-
gues against the existence of ‘winning ticket’ in adversarial
settings. Nevertheless, through experiments we show that
‘winning ticket’ exists in adversarial settings and can be
obtained efficiently with a few rounds of pruning and less
retraining. Our conclusion is different mostly because we
search ‘winning ticket’ by iterative global unstructured prun-
ing as in Frankle and Carbin (2019), while Ye et al. (2019)
uses a layer-wise pruning method. As indicated in Frankle
and Carbin (2019), layers with fewer parameters may be-
come bottlenecks under a layer-wise pruning method, and
thus winning tickets fail to emerge. We also compare our
work with Li et al. (2020), and find the few-shot pruning in
Li et al. (2020) does not outperform iterative pruning results
in our setting.
We also plot the results in Table 1 and Table 3 by show-
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Figure 3: Weights distribution example of the pruned net-
work obtained by one-shot GUP and adversarial lottery at
the same pruning ratio. Note that we have a logarithmic y-axis
such that the near-zero values are highly dense in the upper
part of the figure. The distribution indicates that the adversar-
ial winning tickets have higher sparsity than corresponding
GUP pruned models.
ing the relation between the number of parameters of the
pruned models against the adversarial accuracy in Fig. 1.
By comparing with recent works including RobNet (Guo
et al. 2020) and ATMC (Gui et al. 2019) utilizing the same
training and testing metrics, which is PGD10 and PGD100,
respectively, we demonstrate that our approach are able to
acquire smaller networks with robustness comparable to the
original dense models through adversarial network pruning,
extensively effective under different current model structures
among ResNet, VGG, and DenseNet.
4.4 Inverse Weights Inheritance
According to our experimental results in one-shot adversar-
ial pruning, it seems that networks with smaller capacities
(higher L0-sparsity) can also have an equivalent or even
higher accuracy and robustness than large networks. This
appears to be contradictory to the conclusion in Madry et al.
(2018) that classifying examples in a robust way requires the
model to have a larger capacity, as the decision boundary is
more complicated. We ask the question that, can a network
be sparse and have larger capacity at the same time? As
we analyze, it is indeed possible to have such networks with
superior performance.
Algorithm 2 Inverse Weights Inheritance (w/ Lottery Ticket)
Input: {f (x; θ0 M0), p%, K, N} same as in Alg. 1.
Adversarial fine-tuning epochs Nf .
Output: A robust network f
(
x; θ′′
)
.
1: Find the winning ticket f (x; θ0 MK) by Alg. 1.
2: Adversarially fine-tune the ‘winning ticket’ for Nf epochs,
obtain a robust small network g
(
x; θ′ MK
)
.
3: Load the weights of the pruned network g to the cor-
responding place in the large network f and obtain
f
(
x; θ′ MK
)
.
4: Re-initialize weights of f as
f
(
x; θ′ MK + θ0  (M0 −MK)
)
.
5: Train f until convergence and obtain f
(
x, θ′′
)
.
6: return f
(
x; θ′′
)
.
Table 4: Clean testing accuracy/adversarial testing accuracy (in %)/distortion lower bound. Performance of base networks
are marked under the model name. The performance of the inherited Winning Tickets is shown in Table 3. Performance higher
than the base model is in bold.
(a) Inverse Weights Inheritance on CIFAR-10 (b) Inverse Weights Inheritance on CIFAR-100
Network p% Stop-C Stop-E Network p% Stop-C Stop-E
ResNet18
82.84/49.40/2.519
80 84.05/50.30/2.728 83.14/49.59/2.303
ResNet18
50.50/21.13/3.047
30 53.49/22.07/3.872 51.57/20.68/1.191
90 83.56/49.89/2.819 81.68/49.03/2.662 60 52.98/21.65/3.197 50.74/21.28/3.472
95 84.60/49.34/2.659 83.19/48.93/1.734 80 50.06/21.03/1.900 50.78/21.15/1.881
- - - 90 52.91/21.53/2.812 50.16/21.39/2.056
VGG16
78.57/44.68/3.471
80 81.21/47.38/2.338 81.15/47.46/1.600
VGG16
44.44/18.86/2.338
30 47.18/18.91/1.491 44.79/19.10/1.534
90 81.36/47.54/2.597 80.74/47.53/2.622 60 45.97/19.38/1.147 45.16/18.68/1.191
95 81.29/46.98/3.341 80.68/47.59/3.219 80 46.51/19.22/2.631 43.79/18.90/2.759
- - - 90 47.64/19.26/3.169 43.30/18.94/2.000
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Figure 4: Weights distribution of large networks trained by Inverse Weights Inheritance (IWI) and adversarially trained with
random initialization (Baseline). Net XX% denotes a large network trained by inheriting the weights of a ‘winning ticket’ with
XX% weights pruned.
We introduce a new training strategy called inverse weights
inheritance (IWI), which is inspired by Thm. 2 and adversar-
ial network pruning results. By the strategy, a large network
acquires sparse weights distribution by inheriting weights
from a small robust network, which is pruned from the same
large network in the first place and is adversarially trained.
Alg. 2 gives an example of using the lottery ticket to obtain
such a small network. For a fair comparison, we train the base
networks with Stop-C and Stop-E (240 epochs) and report the
one with higher performance. To train the large network with
inherited weights, we first run Alg. 1 to obtain the ‘winning
ticket’ and then train the ‘winning ticket’ (a small network)
for 120 epochs. Then the weights of the trained ‘winning
ticket’ are loaded back to the large network to train for an-
other 45 epochs (Stop-E) or until convergence (Stop-C). In
Table 4, the large network with inherited weights not only
outperforms the ‘winning ticket’ but also exceeds the base
network.
To find out the reason, we measure the weight distributions
of each network and partial results are given in Fig. 4. It is
clear that, with inherited weights as initialization, the distri-
bution of the final weights for the large networks is sparser
(closer to zero) than those with random initialization, which
is in accord with Thm. 2. The results suggest that for net-
works with the same structure, IWI implicitly finds sparse
weights distribution for the large networks, and the network
can achieve an improved level of clean and adversarial accu-
racies. Moreover, it is evident that those networks are sparse
and have large capacities at the same time.
Beyond performance boost, IWI also accelerates the ad-
versarial training process, mainly due to the lower expense
of adversarially training a small network, and less training
epochs required after the large network inheriting weights.
Details can be found in the supplementary material. We have
also tried other methods, such as using an additional regular-
ization term to impose sparsity in large networks, but it failed.
Interested readers may refer to the supplementary material
for more details.
5 Conclusion
We conduct comprehensive studies on adversarial network
pruning. The contributions are three-fold: First, we give a
new explanation on the connection between robustness and
network sparsity, which is supported by much empirical evi-
dence. Second, we demonstrate the efficacy of training net-
work with robustness via our proposed algorithm including
one-shot pruning and searching the ‘winning ticket.’ Third,
we discover a new adversarial training strategy to achieve
sparsity and large capacity at the same time for robustness.
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